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I. INTRODUCTION
While a body of law has emerged in Washington that permits the
courts to impose fees against a party or the party’s counsel as a sanction,
that body of law has not been coherently examined in the academic setting nor carefully and consistently analyzed in the case law.1 Sanctions
can be imposed at any stage of the litigation. For instance, sanctions
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1. Courts are generally not fond of battles between attorneys. Accordingly, it is advisable that
attorneys seek sanctions against opposing parties sparingly. As the Washington Supreme Court
warned in Wash. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 356, 858 P.2d
1054 (1993):
The purposes of sanctions are to deter, to punish, to compensate and to educate. Where
compensation to litigants is appropriate, then sanctions should include a compensation
award. However, we caution that the sanctions rules are not “fee shifting” rules. Furthermore, requests for sanctions should not turn into satellite litigation or become a “cottage industry” for lawyers.
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may be imposed for filing a baseless lawsuit or defense,2 for filing a frivolous appeal,3 or for abusing the discovery process.4
To compound the problem of a lack of rigor in the analysis of sanctions, the law relating to the calculation of the appropriate fee to be imposed as a sanction is even less certain. In Washington, the courts tend
to favor the lodestar approach when calculating fee awards. Under the
lodestar methodology, the court must: (1) determine the reasonable number of hours expended to secure a successful recovery for the client; (2)
determine the reasonableness of the attorney’s hourly rate; and then (3)
multiply the reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours
incurred, retaining the discretion to adjust the amount upward or downward as justice requires.5
While the Washington Supreme Court has warned that the lodestar
method is not applicable in every situation,6 Washington courts have inconsistently applied the method in situations where a party or attorney is
being sanctioned for misconduct, leading to confusion as to how fees
should be calculated when sanctions are warranted.7 In the absence of
some articulable standard for calculating fees as sanctions, courts may
feel free to award insufficient or excessive fees unconnected to the actual
expense imposed by the sanctionable conduct upon the opposing party or
attorney.
This Article explores and clarifies the principles underlying the imposition of attorney fees as a sanction, providing an overview of the various ways in which attorneys can be sanctioned when they screw up.
The Article discusses Washington law as it applies to sanctions and
briefly analyzes how Washington courts look to comparable federal law
for guidance. Part II begins by analyzing Washington Civil Rule (CR)
11, which prohibits baseless filings at the trial court level. Part III turns
to sanctions under RCW 4.84.185. Part IV addresses sanctions under the
2. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.185 (2006).
3. WASH. R. APP. P. 18.9(a).
4. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 26(g). In addition, a court has the inherent power to impose sanctions for an abuse of the discovery process. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 37; WASH. REV. CODE §
2.28.010(2)–(3) (2004). See also State v. S.H., 102 Wash. App. 468, 473, 8 P.3d 1058 (2000) (noting a court has the power to fashion and impose appropriate sanctions under its inherent authority
even where such sanctions are not statutorily authorized); Wilson v. Henkle, 45 Wash. App. 162,
174–75, 724 P.2d 1069 (1986) (recognizing the courts have the inherent power to impose sanctions
against an attorney for inappropriate and improper conduct amounting to bad faith).
5. See Morgan v. Kingen, 166 Wn.2d 526, 539, 210 P.3d 995 (2009); Mahler v. Szucs, 135
Wash. 2d 398, 433–34, 957 P.2d 632 (1998).
6. See Brand v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. 2d 659, 989 P.2d 1111 (1999) (declining
to use the method in calculating worker compensation fee awards).
7. See, e.g., Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203 v. Racy, 149 Wash. App. 307, 314–316, 202 P.3d
1024 (2009) (noting that the trial court was not mandated to follow the lodestar approach because its
application was optional, but nevertheless analyzing the trial court’s decision under that method).
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Rules of Appellate Procedure, and then Part V discusses sanctions related to the discovery process. The Article concludes by arguing that
much of the confusion surrounding the calculation of attorney fees as a
sanction will be resolved by applying the lodestar method in all four
areas of the law.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CR 11
CR 11 was adopted “to deter baseless filings and to curb abuses of
the judicial system.”8 It applies to every pleading, written motion, and
legal memorandum filed or served during the litigation. CR 11 is not
available, however, if another, more explicit court rule applies.9 The rule
does not apply in appellate proceedings; instead, the appellate courts apply a similar standard under Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) Rule
18.9(a).10
CR 11 requires an attorney to sign pleadings, motions, or legal
memoranda. An attorney’s signature certifies that the attorney believes,
after “an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” that the pleading,
motion or legal memorandum is: (1) well grounded in fact; (2) warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; and (3) not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.11 Furthermore, the attorney’s signature certifies that “the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are
reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.”12 If an attorney
signs a pleading, motion, or legal memorandum in violation of the rule,
the court may impose an “appropriate sanction” against the attorney, the

8. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wash. 2d 210, 219, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992) (noting the rule
addresses two separate problems: baseless filings and filings made for an improper purpose). For an
excellent discussion of the early cases implementing CR 11 and the policy questions surrounding the
rule, see Frederic C. Tausend and Lisa L. Johnsen, Current Status of Rule 11 in the Ninth Circuit and
Washington State, 14 U. PUGET SOUND. L. REV. 419 (1991). See also Peter Ramels, Factual Frivolity: Sanctioning Clients Under Rule 11, 65 WASH. L. REV. 939 (1990).
9. Wash. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 339–40, 858 P.2d
1054 (1993); Biggs v. Vail (Biggs II), 124 Wash. 2d 193, 197, 876 P.2d 448 (1994).
10. 3 Karl B. Tegland, Wash. Prac. Series: Rules Practice at 445, 456 (6th ed. 2004) (noting the
1994 amendments to RAP 18.7 make it clear that CR 11 no longer applies on appeal). See also,
Eugster v. City of Spokane, 139 Wash. App. 21, 34, 156 P.3d 912 (2007) (awarding attorney fees
under RAP 18.9 for defending against a frivolous appeal).
11. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11(a).
12. Id.
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represented person, or both.13 A court may impose sanctions pursuant to
motion or on its own initiative.14
The party moving for sanctions bears the burden to justify the request.15 In addition, the party seeking sanctions under CR 11 should notify the offending party of the objectionable conduct and provide that
person with an opportunity to mitigate the sanction by amending or
withdrawing the paper.16 The counterpart federal rule provides a party
with a twenty-one day safe harbor period during which the challenged
pleading may be withdrawn.17
Washington courts have developed criteria to determine whether
the imposition of sanctions is appropriate. In Miller v. Badgley,18 the
court of appeals introduced a test to determine when a court may impose
CR 11 sanctions.19 The court explained that sanctions under CR 11 may
be imposed if any one of three conditions are met: (1) the attorney failed
to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts supporting the paper; (2)
the attorney failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law to ensure
that the pleading filed is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (3)
the attorney filed the pleading for an improper purpose such as delay,
harassment, or to increase the costs of litigation.20 In Blair v. GIM
Corp.,21 the court of appeals further explained that a filing is baseless
only if it is not well grounded in fact, or not warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the alteration of existing law.22 These cases
provide the necessary framework to determine whether the imposition of
sanctions is appropriate.
In 2005, the Washington Supreme Court amended CR 11.23 The
amended rule permits attorneys to advance legal arguments seeking a
good faith establishment of new law without risking sanctions.24 It also
authorizes the imposition of sanctions for baseless denials of factual con13. CR 11 also requires a similar certification from an attorney helping to draft pleadings,
motions, or other documents filed by otherwise self-represented persons; however, the attorney “may
rely on the otherwise self-represented person’s representation of facts, unless the attorney has reason
to believe that such representations are false or materially insufficient.” WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R.
11(b).
14. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11(a).
15. Biggs v. Vail (Biggs II), 124 Wash. 2d 193, 202, 876 P.2d 448 (1994).
16. Id. at 198 n.2.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
18. 51 Wash. App. 285, 753 P.2d 530 (1988).
19. Id. at 300.
20. Id.
21. 88 Wash. App. 475, 945 P.2d 1149 (1997).
22. Id. at 482–83.
23. Amendment to WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11, 154 Wash. 2d 1114–15 (2005).
24. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11.
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tentions, like those found in answers.25 These amendments make CR 11
more closely parallel Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11).
Moreover, the rule now reflects the three conditions outlined in Miller.26
Nonetheless, the courts remain divided over whether a finding that one of
these conditions has been met is enough to satisfy the rule or whether a
finding that all three conditions have been met is required before sanctions can be imposed.27
At a minimum, CR 11 requires attorneys to undertake a reasonable
inquiry into the facts and the law before filing any pleading. The rule
“requires attorneys to stop, think, and investigate more carefully before
serving and filing papers.”28 It was intended to deter the “shoot-firstand-ask-questions-later” approach to the practice of law.29 The following subsections examine aspects of the rule in greater detail.
A. Attorneys Must Make a Reasonable Inquiry into the Law and the
Facts
While CR 11’s mandate is ongoing throughout the litigation,30
sanctions are not appropriate merely because an action’s factual basis
ultimately proves deficient or a party’s view of the law proves incorrect.31 Similarly, sanctions against an attorney are not warranted merely
because the trier of fact found the attorney’s client not credible.32
Because there are instances where the imposition of sanctions is inappropriate, courts must carefully evaluate whether an attorney’s inquiry
into the law and the facts was reasonable. Washington courts evaluate
the reasonableness of the attorney’s pre-filing inquiry under the objective
25. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11(a).
26. Compare WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11, with Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 300, 753
P.2d 530 (1988).
27. In Miller, 51 Wash. App. at 300, 301–02, and McClure v. Tremaine, 77 Wash. App. 312,
318, 890 P.2d 466 (1995), the courts concluded that a finding of one element is sufficient to impose
sanctions. On the other side, in Doe v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 55 Wash. App. 106,
110–11, 780 P.2d 853 (1989), and Harrington v. Pailthorp, 67 Wash. App. 901, 910, 841 P.2d 1258
(1992), the courts determined that all three elements must be established before imposing sanctions.
28. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, 119 Wash. 2d 210, 219, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992) (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 192 (1983)).
29. Watson v. Maier, 64 Wash. App. 889, 898, 827 P.2d 311 (1992).
30. Doe, 55 Wash. App. at 114 (explaining that once reasonable inquiry reveals party should be
dismissed, signature on subsequent pleadings in furtherance of claim is a violation of CR 11); MacDonald v. Korum Ford, 80 Wash. App. 877, 888, 912 P.2d 1052 (1996) (finding a violation of CR
11 where, after client’s deposition, attorney lacked factual basis for pursuing claim).
31. Roeber v. Dowty Aerospace Yakima, 116 Wash. App. 127, 142, 64 P.3d 691 (2003) (determining that the failure to establish prima facie civil rights case did not equate with complete lack
of factual basis).
32. Saldivar v. Momah, 145 Wash. App. 365, 403, 186 P.3d 1117 (2008), as amended (July 15,
2008).
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standard of “‘reasonableness under the circumstances.’”33 In making this
determination, the courts may consider such factors as:
[T]he time that was available to the signer, the extent of the attorney’s reliance upon the client for factual support, whether a signing
attorney accepted a case from another member of the bar or forwarding attorney, the complexity of the factual and legal issues, and
the need for discovery to develop factual circumstances underlying
a claim.34

In Cascade Brigade v. Economic Development Board for TacomaPierce County,35 the court of appeals mentioned additional factors to be
considered when determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s prefiling inquiry: “The knowledge that reasonably could have been acquired
at the time the pleading was filed, the type of claim and the difficulty of
acquiring sufficient information, which party has access to the relevant
facts, and the significance of the claim in the pleading as a whole.”36
Relying on the client for the facts may not be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CR 11.37 Moreover, an attorney’s subjective belief about
the veracity of the pleading is irrelevant.38
B. Attorneys May Not File Pleadings for an Improper Purpose
CR 11 sanctions are appropriate if the pleading is filed for an improper purpose. For example, in Suarez v. Newquist,39 the attorney attempted to file multiple affidavits of prejudice.40 After the trial court
rejected the affidavits, the attorney then attempted to file an affidavit of
his own.41 After the trial judge rejected that affidavit, the attorney admitted he was unprepared to argue the summary judgment motion. Nevertheless, the trial court did not impose CR 11 sanctions.42 The court of
appeals determined that the attorney misused the affidavits to improperly
delay the proceeding, held that the trial court abused its discretion in not
imposing sanctions, and remanded to the trial court to impose sanctions
33. Bryant, 119 Wash. 2d at 220 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D
165, 198 (1983)).
34. Id. at 220–21.
35. 61 Wash. App. 615, 811 P.2d 697 (1991).
36. Id. at 620 (citations omitted).
37. In re Guardianship of Lasky, 54 Wash. App. 841, 854, 776 P.2d 695 (1989); Miller v.
Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 302, 753 P.2d 530 (1988).
38. Miller, 51 Wash. App. at 299–300. See also Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,
762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that an attorney’s subjective good faith no longer provides
the safe harbor that it once did).
39. 70 Wash. App. 827, 855 P.2d 1200 (1993).
40. Id. at 834.
41. Id. at 835.
42. Id.
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for the attorney’s violations of CR 11.43 Suarez’s significance should not
be overlooked: the case permits the imposition of sanctions for an attorney’s ill-motivated actions without regard to the three conditions enunciated in Miller.
Also instructive is Skilcraft Fiberglass, Inc. v. Boeing Co.,44 in
which a supplier obtained, without notice, a default judgment against the
primary contractor and the owner of the property where the construction
project had taken place.45 The contractor and the property owner filed a
motion to vacate the default judgment and to impose sanctions against
the supplier. The trial court granted the motion after concluding that the
supplier’s attorney had obtained the default judgment against the property owner improperly because the contractor’s bond had released the lien
on the property.46 The court also concluded that the supplier’s attorney
failed to serve the default motion on the contractor and the property
owner, even though they were entitled to notice of the default proceedings.47 The court awarded sanctions based on the attorney’s breach of his
duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and the facts and his
duty not to interpose the motion for purposes of delay or harassment or
to increase the costs of litigation.48 The court of appeals affirmed the
sanctions award after concluding that the attorney’s actions were interposed for an improper purpose.49 As both Suarez and Skilcraft confirm,
the “improper purpose” element is a separate and independent justification for an award of sanctions under CR 11.50
C. Courts May Impose Sanctions Against an Attorney, a Party, or Both
If CR 11 is violated, a court may impose sanctions against the offending attorney, a party, or both.51 As the Cascade Brigade court succinctly stated, “Starting a lawsuit is no trifling thing. By the simple act

43. Id. The court also determined the attorney failed to satisfy his duty to make a reasonable
pre-filing inquiry by relying solely on the clerk’s opinion when filing one of his affidavits of prejudice. Id. at 834.
44. 72 Wash. App. 40, 863 P.2d 573 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by Morin v. Burris,
160 Wash. 2d 745, 756–57, 161 P.3d 956 (2007).
45. Id. at 43.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 44.
48. Id. at 44 n.1.
49. Id. at 47–48.
50. See Harrington v. Pailthorp, 67 Wash. App. 901, 912–13, 841 P.2d 1258 (1992).
51. The issue of whether sanctions should be imposed against the attorney, the client, or both is
troublesome. CR 11 governs the conduct of an attorney in signing pleadings. The determination of
whether to file a lawsuit or submit a pleading is a practical decision that rests with the attorney.
When the attorney has reservations about submitting a pleading, a discussion with the client about
the meaning of CR 11 is essential.
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of signing a pleading, an attorney sets in motion a chain of events that
surely will hurt someone. Because of CR 11, that someone may be the
attorney.”52 Indeed, while CR 11 allows the imposition of penalties
against both a party and the party’s attorney, the attorney usually bears
the burden for violating the rule given the attorney’s heightened duty to
the court. The rule applies, however, with equal force to pro se parties.53
In 1993, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the idea that sanctions are mandatory by deleting the word “shall” from the language of
the rule in favor of the more permissive “may.”54 Although the courts
have substantial discretion when considering the imposition of sanctions
under CR 11,55 some courts nevertheless continue to mistakenly assume
sanctions are mandatory.56
A court may look to the purpose behind CR 11 to determine whether to exercise its discretion under the circumstances and impose sanctions. For example, in Cascade Brigade, the court of appeals upheld the
trial court’s imposition of sanctions after finding that an attorney
representing Cascade Brigade had filed suit without “one fact to support
[his] position,” and had “no basis in law for” the suit.57 The court held
that the applicable law governing the suit was straight-forward and discoverable with minimal research, that the attorney failed to produce any
facts to support the suit, and that the attorney had learned of relevant
contracts but never obtained or read them before starting the lawsuit.58
In making this determination, the court focused on the policy behind CR
11, which is to reduce the number of baseless lawsuits, and noted that the
attorney’s “action in filing suit and moving for summary judgment without facts typifies the shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later approach to the
practice of law, an approach that CR 11 was intended to inhibit.”59 Under these circumstances, the court determined that the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion to impose sanctions.

52. Cascade Brigade v. Econ. Dev. Bd. For Tacoma-Pierce County, 61 Wash. App. 615, 617,
811 P.2d 697 (1991).
53. Harrington, 67 Wash. App. at 910. See also Brian L. Holtzclaw, Pro Se Litigants: Application of a Single Objective Standard under FRCP 11 to Reduce Frivolous Litigation, 16 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 1371, 1371–72 (1993).
54. Amendment to WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11, 122 Wash. 2d 1102 (1993). See also Rudolph
v. Empirical Research Sys., Inc., 107 Wash. App. 861, 866, 28 P.3d 813 (2001) (noting that the
Washington Supreme Court’s use of “shall” in a court rule creates a mandatory duty while “may” is
permissive and discretionary).
55. Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 303, 753 P.2d 530 (1988).
56. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 91 Wash. App. 127, 135, 955 P.2d 826 (1998).
57. 61 Wash. App. at 619–20.
58. Id. at 623–24.
59. Id. at 624. The court declined to use the word “frivolous” to describe the lawsuits that CR
11 is designed to discourage because the word is not contained in the rule. Id. at 626 n.8.
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Given that the primary goal of CR 11 is to rid the courts of baseless
litigation and to reduce the growing costs of litigation, it is unsurprising
that courts almost always impose sanctions upon the attorney rather than
on the attorney’s client. “About half of the practice of a decent lawyer is
telling would be clients that they are damned fools and should stop.”60
The Watson court held that sanctions were properly imposed on an attorney who brought suit against a physician without “a shred of evidence”
that the physician was even present during the allegedly negligent surgery.61 The court rejected the attorney’s argument that penalties should
not be imposed on him because he was following a consulting firm’s advice in joining the physician, noting that CR 11 requires an attorney to
make an objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts supporting his case
before filing a lawsuit.62 Blind reliance on the consulting firm’s advice,
the court held, did not begin to satisfy the attorney’s CR 11 obligations.63
Nor can an attorney rely on merely the client’s assurances that facts exist
when a reasonable inquiry would reveal otherwise.64
In addition to investigating the client’s version of the facts, an attorney must investigate the legal validity of all claims asserted. In Madden v. Foley,65 the trial court imposed CR 11 sanctions on the plaintiff,
the plaintiff’s attorney, and the attorney’s law firm after determining that
nearly all of the plaintiff’s claims were grounded in alienation of affection, a cause of action that no longer existed in Washington.66 The only
challenge on appeal was to the imposition of sanctions against the attorney and the firm; the court of appeals upheld the imposition of sanctions
against both.67 The court held that the attorney failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into whether the complaint had a proper foundation
in law and fact and that the allegations indeed amounted to nothing more
than a claim for alienation of affection.68 The court also upheld sanctions
against the law firm because the attorney signed the pleadings as an
agent of the firm.69 The court observed that the policies underlying CR
11 are best served when the rule is interpreted broadly, enabling a court

60. Watson v. Maier, 64 Wash. App. 889, 891, 827 P.2d 311 (1992) (quoting Elihu Root, the
United States Secretary of State from 1905–1909, quoted in McCandless v. Great Atlantic & Pac.
Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 201–02 (7th Cir. 1983)).
61. Id. at 897.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 83 Wash. App. 385, 922 P.2d 1364 (1996).
66. Id. at 388.
67. Id. at 393.
68. Id. at 390–91.
69. Id. at 392.
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to fashion a penalty that deters litigation abuses efficiently and effectively.70
In In re Cooke,71 on the other hand, the court of appeals upheld the
imposition of sanctions against the plaintiff rather than the plaintiff’s
attorney because the plaintiff used his attorney’s pleading papers.72 Notably, the plaintiff signed the filing, not the attorney.73
D. Determining the Appropriate Sanction
Washington courts retain broad discretion to tailor an appropriate
sanction and to determine against whom such a sanction should be imposed.74 Appellate courts will review the sanctions imposed under CR
11 for an abuse of discretion, both as to the trial court’s decision to impose sanctions and to the nature of the sanctions imposed.75
Although the courts are ready and willing to impose sanctions under CR 11 and its counterparts,76 “the least severe sanctions adequate to
serve the purpose should be imposed.”77 In some instances, nonmonetary sanctions such as a reprimand may be sufficient.78 Notably,
CR 11 sanctions are not designed to be another fee-shifting mechanism.79
When the trial court awards attorney fees as a sanction, it must limit
those fees to the amounts reasonably expended in responding to the improper pleadings.80 Furthermore, “[a] party resisting a motion that violates CR 11 has a duty to mitigate and may not recover excessive expenditures.”81
The Washington Supreme Court’s treatment of sanctions in Biggs v.
Vail is particularly instructive with respect to the complexities that may
arise in CR 11 cases.82 Biggs began as a dispute over who should receive
certain attorney fees earned by Patrick Biggs while employed as an at-

70. Id.
71. 93 Wash. App. 526, 969 P.2d 127 (1999).
72. Id. at 527–28, 530.
73. Id.
74. Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 303, 753 P.2d 530 (1988).
75. State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verharen, 136 Wash. 2d 888, 903, 969 P.2d 64 (1998) (applying abuse of discretion standard to the decision to award fees); Reid v. Dalton, 124 Wash. App. 113,
125, 100 P.3d 349 (2004) (applying abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the amount of
fees was appropriate).
76. In re Guardianship of Lasky, 54 Wash. App. 841, 854–56, 776 P.2d 695 (1989).
77. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, 119 Wash. 2d 210, 225, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992).
78. Miller, 51 Wash. App. at 303.
79. Bryant, 19 Wash. 2d at 220.
80. MacDonald v. Korum Ford, 80 Wash. App. 877, 891, 912 P.2d 1052 (1996).
81. Miller, 51 Wash. App. at 303.
82. Biggs v. Vail (Biggs I), 119 Wash. 2d 129, 830 P.2d 350 (1992); Biggs v. Vail (Biggs II),
124 Wash. 2d 193, 876 P.2d 448 (1994).
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torney by David Vail.83 Biggs sued Vail, alleging a myriad of claims,
including breach of contract.84 The trial court found in favor of Vail on
the breach of contract claim and determined that Biggs’s other claims
were frivolous. The court awarded Vail $25,000 in attorney fees.85 The
court of appeals affirmed the judgment and awarded fees for a frivolous
appeal. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the fee award.86
After the mandate was issued, Vail filed a motion in the trial court
for sanctions under CR 11.87 The trial court granted the motion and
awarded sanctions. But it did not specify the conduct meriting the sanction and failed to explain the basis for reducing Vail’s claim.88 The
Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded a second time, noting that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion when awarding the
same amount of sanctions previously disallowed without further inquiry.89 Importantly, the court cautioned that reinstating the previous
sanction a second time “regardless of its findings, would be presumptively unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.”90 The court concluded that
a nonmonetary sanction was appropriate because Biggs was no longer
practicing law.91 In the court’s view, his exit from the profession was
enough to deter any future abuse.92
E. Federal Law Provides Additional Guidance to Determine Appropriate
Sanctions
CR 11 shares many similarities with Rule 11.93 When the language
of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the same, courts look
83. Biggs I, 119 Wash. 2d at 131.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 132.
86. Id.
87. Biggs II, 124 Wash. 2d at 196.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 202.
90. Id. at 202 n.3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 provides in part:
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least
one attorney of record . . . or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented . . . .
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting . . . a pleading, written motion, or other
paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
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to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guidance.94 The federal rule
reinforces the duty of candor by subjecting litigants who persist in litigation after it is no longer tenable to potential sanctions.95 Litigants in federal court may avoid the imposition of sanctions if they withdraw or correct contentions after a potential violation is called to their attention.96
The imposition of a Rule 11 sanction constitutes a determination that an
attorney has abused the judicial process rather than a judgment on the
merits of an action.97 As with the state rule, federal courts look askance
at the use of Rule 11 as a combative tool because the rules governing the
ethical conduct of lawyers are too important to be trivialized and to be
used in baseless mud-slinging.98
Again mirroring the state rule, Rule 11 should not serve as a fee
shifting mechanism to compensate the prevailing party; instead, courts
must aim to deter and punish improper conduct.99 Courts must apply the
rule so as to give effect to its principal goal of deterrence.100 Notwithstanding its central purpose to deter vexatious litigation, the rule should
not be construed as a bar to litigation; allegations need not be perfect

discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
(c) Sanctions.
(1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule
or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law
firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner,
associate, or employee.
...
(4) Nature of a Sanction. A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited
to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary directives;
an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted
for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or
all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from
the violation.
...
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. This rule does not apply to disclosures and discovery
requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37.
94. See, e.g., Am. Disc. Corp. v. Saratoga W., Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 37–38, 499 P.2d 869
(1972). See also Bryant v. Joseph Tree, 119 Wash. 2d 210, 221, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992) (construing
CR 11 in light of FRCP 11 because the state rule is modeled after and is substantially similar to the
federal rule).
95. Young v. Corbin, 889 F. Supp. 582, 585 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
96. Id.
97. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990).
98. Autrey v. United States, 889 F.2d 973, 986, reh’g denied 897 F.2d 537 (11th Cir. 1989).
99. United States ex rel. Leno v. Summit Constr. Co., 892 F.2d 788, 791 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989).
100. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 393.
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from the outset to avoid sanctions under the rule.101 Rule 11 allows attorneys to make claims as long as the allegations contained in them are
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. However, the rule does not give litigants
general license to plead their claim first and investigate later.102 As with
CR 11, the party who signs documents must conduct an inquiry into the
facts and law in order to be satisfied that document is well grounded.103
Under the federal rule, litigants are not free to sign frivolous or vexatious
documents with impunity.104
III. RCW 4.84.185
CR 11’s goal of deterring vexatious litigation is reinforced by RCW
4.84.185.105 In enacting the statute,106 the legislature expressed concern
about the baseless claims and defenses confronting the courts.107 It designed the statute to discourage frivolous lawsuits and to compensate
victims forced to litigate meritless cases.108 Unlike CR 11, the action
must be frivolous in its entirety for the statute to apply.109 If any claim
has merit, then the action is not frivolous under RCW 4.84.185.110 While
the concept of “frivolity” may be amorphous, it is neither vague nor unconstitutional.111 By contrast, CR 11 may apply to a single issue.112
101. Foster v. Michelin Tire Corp., 108 F.R.D. 412, 415 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
102. Geisinger Med. Ctr. v. Gough, 160 F.R.D. 467, 469 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
103. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comm’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 543–44 (1991).
104. Id.
105. Despite being created by different entities, WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11 and WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.84.185 (2006) are virtually interchangeable.
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.185 (2006) states, in pertinent part:
In any civil action, the court . . . may, upon written findings by the judge that the action,
counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense was frivolous and advanced
without reasonable cause, require the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party the
reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred in opposing such action . . .
This determination shall be made upon motion by the prevailing party after a[n] . . . order
of dismissal, order on summary judgment, final judgment after trial or other final order
terminating the action as to the prevailing party. The judge shall consider all evidence
presented at the time of the motion to determine whether the position of the nonprevailing
party was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause. In no event may such motion be filed more than thirty days after entry of the order.
107. Biggs v. Vail (Biggs I), 119 Wash. 2d 129, 134–37 (1992) (reviewing and interpreting the
legislative history of WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.185 (1991)).
108. Id. at 137.
109. State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verharen, 136 Wash. 2d 888, 903–04, 969 P.2d 64 (1998);
Biggs I, 119 Wash. 2d at 136; Jeckle v. Crotty, 120 Wash. App. 374, 85 P.3d 931 (2004).
110. In re Cooke, 93 Wash. App. 526, 530, 969 P.2d 127 (1999). See also Biggs I, 119 Wash.
2d at 137 (finding that although three of four claims were frivolous, the action as a whole could not
be deemed frivolous).
111. Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, Inc., 59 Wash. App. 332, 340, 798 P.2d 1155 (1990).
112. In re MacGibbon, 139 Wash. App. 496, 499, 161 P.3d 441 (2007).
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The substantive standard for a frivolous action under the statute
largely mirrors the standard articulated in CR 11.113 But unlike most CR
11 sanctions, the client, not the attorney, pays the sanctions imposed under RCW 4.84.185.114 If the issue in the case is “debatable” and there is
a rational argument under the law and the facts to support it, fees must be
denied.115 Similarly, issues of first impression are not frivolous.116 The
decision whether to award attorney fees for a frivolous lawsuit is within
the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse.117
RCW 4.84.185 also has a parallel in federal law: 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
While not directly analogous, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is also intended to deter
attorneys or other persons from unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying or extending the proceedings in a case by awarding costs, expenses,
and attorney fees against them.118 An attorney’s harassing or annoying
conduct need not be intentional or consciously improper for a court to
impose sanctions; it is enough that the attorney displays a serious and
studied disregard for the orderly administration of justice.119 Inartful
pleading and ignorance of legal requirements do not amount to an intentional abuse of the judicial process because an untenable claim is not improper conduct. Instead, evidence of recklessness, improper motive, or
bad faith must be present.120 As with CR 11, federal courts apply an objective standard when determining whether to impose sanctions.121
113. See Harrington v. Pailthorp, 67 Wash. App. 901, 911–13, 841 P.2d 1258 (1992) (analyzing claims under both the civil rule and the statute).
114. Biggs I, 119 Wash. 2d at 137; Skimming v. Boxer, 119 Wash. App. 748, 756, 82 P.3d 707
(2004); Watson v. Maier, 64 Wash. App. 889, 896, 827 P.2d 311 (1992).
115. Bill of Rights Legal Found. v. Evergreen State Coll., 44 Wash. App. 690, 696–97, 723
P.2d 483 (1986).
116. Collinson v. John L. Scott, Inc., 55 Wash. App. 481, 488, 778 P.2d 534 (1989) (holding
that a claim of obstruction of view as nuisance not frivolous as one of first impression). Nor can
issues of substantial public importance be said to be frivolous. Moorman v. Walker, 54 Wash. App.
461, 465–66, 773 P.2d 887 (1989) (holding that a claim of mother’s misrepresentation of inability to
conceive to be novel and of substantial public importance, thus not frivolous).
117. Fluke Capital & Mgmt. Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 106 Wash. 2d 614, 625, 724 P.2d 356
(1986).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980) states:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States
or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
119. Obert v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 106, 124 (D.R.I. 2003) (internal citations
omitted).
120. Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner, La., Inc., 38 F.3d 1414, 1416–17 (5th Cir.
1994); Murray v. Playmaker Servs., LLC, 548 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d, No.
08-12908, 2009 WL 1291769 (11th Cir. May 8, 2009); Gianna Enters. v. Miss World (Jersey) Ltd.,
551 F. Supp. 1348, 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
121. Amalong & Amalong, P.A. v. Denny’s Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2007).
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Because of the potential for abuse, federal courts122 construe the
statute narrowly and with great caution.123 Federal courts utilize the statute only where there is evidence of serious disregard for the orderly administration of justice.124 A court may impose sanctions under § 1927 on
its own volition and at its own discretion.125 The statute permits a court
to require an attorney to personally pay costs incurred due to his or her
unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of legal proceedings.126 Costs
assessed under the statute are limited to those excess costs arising out of
the attorney’s vexatious behavior and subsequent complication or extension of the legal proceedings and may not amount to the total costs of
litigation.127 The relative wealth of the parties may be considered in determining the sanction imposed.128
Despite the apparent similarity of § 1927 to Rule 11, the two rules
have significant substantive and procedural differences and cannot be
imposed as an alternative to one another.129 Section 1927 is broader in
scope than Rule 11. It is not triggered by the mere filing of frivolous
claims; instead, it imposes a continuing restraint upon an attorney’s conduct throughout the course of the proceedings.130 A court may find cause
to impose sanctions under Rule 11 while finding no cause to impose
sanction under § 1927.131
IV. FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
Washington appellate courts have awarded fees on appeal to parties
who have abused the appellate rules or have filed frivolous appeals.132
122. The federal statute is not limited to district courts; courts of appeals may likewise impose
sanctions on an attorney for his or her unreasonable and vexatious conduct. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.
Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 638 (9th Cir. 1987).
123. Mone v. Comm’r, 774 F.2d 570, 574 (2nd Cir. 1985).
124. Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 768 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1985).
125. Jolly Group, Ltd. v. Medline Indus., Inc., 435 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 2006).
126. United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 349 (6th Cir. 1976).
127. Rogers v. Kroger Co., 586 F. Supp. 597, 602 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
128. Id. at 603.
129. Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2000).
130. See In re Sowers, 97 B.R. 480, 484 (N.D. Ind. 1989).
131. In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 101 (3rd Cir. 2008).
132. WASH. R. APP. P. 18.9(a) states:
The appellate court on its own initiative or on motion of a party may order a party or
counsel, or a court reporter or other authorized person preparing a verbatim report of proceedings, who uses these rules for the purpose of delay, files a frivolous appeal, or fails to
comply with these rules to pay terms or compensatory damages to any other party who
has been harmed by the delay or the failure to comply or to pay sanctions to the court.
See also WASH. R. APP. P. 18.7; WASH. R. APP. P. 18.9(a). See generally WASHINGTON STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, APPELLATE PRACTICE DESKBOOK, § 26.3 (Wash. State Bar Assoc. 3d ed. 2005);
Philip A. Talmadge, Toward a Reduction of Washington Appellate Court Caseloads and More Effective Use of Appellate Court Resources, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 21, 34–37 (1985).
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No cases discuss the particular method used to determine such fees under
RAP 18.9(a); in practice, however, appellate court commissioners use the
lodestar method.133
In determining whether an appeal is frivolous, the courts have been
guided since at least 1980 by the following considerations:
(1) A civil appellant has a right to appeal under RAP 2.2; (2) all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the appellant; (3) the record
should be considered as a whole; (4) an appeal that is affirmed
simply because the arguments are rejected is not frivolous; (5) an
appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ, and it is so totally devoid of merit that
there was no reasonable possibility of reversal.134

More specifically, an appeal is frivolous if it is essentially factual rather
than legal in nature, if it involves discretionary rulings and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion, or if the appellant cannot cite any authority
to support his or her position.135 An appeal is not frivolous simply because the appellant’s arguments were rejected.136 Similarly, an appeal is
not frivolous if it involves an issue of first impression.137 A respondent
may recover his or her fees on appeal from the party filing a frivolous
appeal.138
RAP 18.9(a) and RAP 18.7 both govern the imposition of sanctions
on appeal. RAP 18.9(a) permits an appellate court to impose sanctions
where a party uses the rules to delay or for an improper purpose. RAP
18.7 specifically incorporates the provisions of CR 11, which suggests
that a single frivolous appellate issue may be sanctionable.139 An appel133. Case law on this subject is largely confined to unpublished opinions in which the appellate courts, on finding an appeal to be frivolous, have directed a court commissioner to determine the
amount of the award. But see Lynn v. Labor Ready, Inc., 136 Wash. App. 295, 314, 151 P.3d 201
(2006) (directing the court commissioner to determine reasonable attorney fees as a sanction under
RAP 18.9(a) for making substantive misrepresentations to the court in a published decision).
134. Streater v. White, 26 Wash. App. 430, 435, 613 P.2d 187 (1980).
135. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 91 Wash. App. 127, 137–138, 955 P.2d 826 (1998) (finding
no reasonable basis to argue the trial court abused its discretion); Clarke v. Equinox Holdings, Ltd.,
56 Wash. App. 125, 133, 783 P.2d 82 (1989) (finding an action to be frivolous where appellant
failed to support his constitutional challenge with argument or authority, and his other claims were
completely devoid of merit); Sherwood v. Bellevue Dodge, Inc., 35 Wash. App. 741, 750, 669 P.2d
1258 (1983) (declining to award sanctions where the appeal was not purely factual).
136. Streater, 26 Wash. App. at 435.
137. Olson v. City of Bellevue, 93 Wash. App. 154, 165–66, 968 P.2d 894 (1998); Cary v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 78 Wash. App. 434, 440–41, 897 P.2d 409 (1995), aff’d, 130 Wash. 2d 335, 922
P.2d 1335 (1996).
138. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Biggs, 100 Wash. 2d 9, 15, 665 P.2d 887 (1983); Boyles v. Dep’t
of Ret. Sys., 105 Wash. 2d 499, 506, 716 P.2d 869 (1986).
139. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, 119 Wash. 2d 210, 223, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992) (“RAP 18.7 provides, however, that: ‘[e]ach paper filed pursuant to [the Rules of Appellate Procedure] should be
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late court may also impose sanctions for a party’s recalcitrance or obstructionism.140 A party that files a series of groundless motions and appeals may also face sanctions.141 A party appealing a trial court’s sanction decision may be deemed to be continuing such intransigence and
face sanctions on appeal.142
A respondent must comply with all of the requirements of
RAP 18.1 relating to an award of attorney fees and expenses when requesting the imposition of sanctions against an appellant for the filing of
a frivolous appeal.143 For example, RAP 18.1(b) requires the requesting
party to devote a section of his or her opening brief to the request for
fees. Moreover, within ten days after a decision awarding the requesting
party the right to a reasonable attorney fee is entered, that party must
serve and file an affidavit detailing the expenses incurred and the services performed by counsel.144
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure likewise permit damages
to compensate appellees forced to defend against frivolous appeals.145
Under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 38, an appeal is frivolous
when it is litigated with no reasonable expectation of altering the district
court’s judgment and is filed for purposes of delay or harassment or out
of sheer obstinacy.146 Sanctions may be imposed on plaintiffs as well as
their attorneys.147 Appellate Rule 38, to the extent it deals with questions
of procedure, is controlling over provisions of state statutes in conflict
with the rule.148 The decision to impose sanctions under Appellate Rule
38 is discretionary.149

dated and signed by an attorney or party as provided in CR 11. . . .’”); Layne v. Hyde, 54 Wash.
App. 125, 136, 773 P.2d 83 (1989).
140. In re Adoption of B.T., 150 Wash. 2d 409, 421, 78 P.3d 634 (2003).
141. Rich v. Starczewski, 29 Wash. App. 244, 247–48, 628 P.2d 831 (1981).
142. Delany v. Canning, 84 Wash. App. 498, 501–02, 929 P.2d 475 (1997).
143. Cf. Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 52 Wash. App. 531, 362 n.1, 762 P.2d 356 (1988) (finding
sua sponte that the appeal was frivolous, but declining to award fees because respondent did not
comply with RAP 8.1).
144. WASH. R. APP. P. 18.1(d).
145. Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3rd Cir. 1993). If a court of appeals determines that
an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court with reasonable
opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee. FED. R. APP.
P. 38.
146. Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1996).
147. In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 763 F.2d 507, 517 (2d Cir. 1985); Nunley v. Comm’r,
758 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1985).
148. See Nordmeyer v. Sanzone, 315 F.2d 780, 781–82 (6th Cir. 1963) (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure trump the state statute that awards damages for delay on affirmance of
money judgment).
149. In re George, 322 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2003).
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V. DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
A trend exists in Washington cases, anticipated in Fisons, for discovery sanctions to serve as a cottage industry for the trial bar.150 Parties
claiming discovery abuses can re-litigate their cases and recover all fees,
even those incurred on seemingly unrelated matters.151 But the discovery
rules are intended to “make a trial less a game of blindman’s bluff and
more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest
practicable extent.”152 Washington courts require parties to be candid
with one another in discovery.153 The Washington Supreme Court best
articulated this policy in Fisons, noting that “a spirit of cooperation and
forthrightness during the discovery process is necessary for the proper
functioning of modern trials.”154
To enforce the spirit of cooperation underlying the discovery rules,
the court may impose sanctions for a party’s failure to cooperate. Sanctions for discovery-related misconduct may be imposed in three ways:
(1) under CR 26(g), relating to the effect of certification of discovery
answers; (2) under CR 37(b), relating to discovery sanctions for violations of court orders or violation of court rules; or (3) under the court’s
inherent authority.155
In cases where sanctions have been imposed, courts have ordinarily
required egregious conduct by trial counsel. For example, in Gammon v.
Clark, the plaintiff’s counsel asked the manufacturer of a Bobcat loader
that tipped over and killed the plaintiff’s husband to produce information
during discovery regarding injuries arising out of the use of the same or
similar equipment.156 The manufacturer initially provided five accident
reports and produced fifty more following an order to compel production.157 Once trial began, the manufacturer produced two boxes of additional reports that were revealed in a deposition.158 The court of appeals
150. Wash. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 356, 858 P.2d
1054 (1993).
151. See, e.g., Smith v. Behr Processing Corp., 113 Wash. App. 306, 323–325, 54 P.3d 665
(2002); Mayer v. Sto Indust., Inc. (Mayer II), 156 Wash. 2d 677, 692–93, 132 P.3d 115 (2006);
Magana v. Hyundai Motor Corp. of Am., 141 Wash. App. 495, 509, 170 P.3d 1165 (2007), review
granted, 164 Wash. 2d 1020 (2008).
152. Gammon v. Clark Equip. Co., 38 Wash. App. 274, 279–80, 686 P.2d 1102 (1984) (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958)), aff’d on other grounds, 104
Wash. 2d 613 (1985).
153. Id. at 281–82; Wash. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299,
343, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993); Taylor v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 39 Wash. App. 828, 835–36, 696 P.2d 28
(1985).
154. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 342.
155. Id. at 339–40, 343.
156. Gammon, 38 Wash. App. at 277.
157. Id. at 277–78.
158. Id. at 279.
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found a $2,500 sanction against the manufacturer inadequate to ensure
that the manufacturer did not profit from its wrong and awarded a new
trial.159
Similarly, in Taylor v. Cessna Aircraft Co., an aircraft manufacturer
concealed the results of testing performed on an aircraft’s fuel systems
despite subpoenas duces tecum requesting that information and an order
directing it to comply with the subpoena.160 Nonetheless, the trial court
found the manufacturer’s conduct reasonable and refused to grant the
plaintiffs’ second motion for a new trial.161 The court of appeals disagreed, noting that it was not for the manufacturer to unilaterally decide
what was relevant during discovery.162 The court granted the plaintiffs a
new trial based on the manufacturer’s misconduct.163
In Fisons, the Washington Supreme Court upheld sanctions against
a pharmaceutical company that deliberately withheld two “smoking gun”
letters from an injured plaintiff and her doctor.164 The letters revealed
that the company had warned other selected physicians of the precise
hazards of the drug that had caused the plaintiff’s injuries.165 The court
stated that an attorney’s CR 26(g) discovery responses certification must
be evaluated under an objective standard to assess if the attorney’s actions were reasonable:
In determining whether an attorney has complied with the rule, the
court should consider all of the surrounding circumstances, the importance of the evidence to its proponent, and the ability of the opposing party to formulate a response or to comply with the request.166

In finding the drug company’s conduct sanctionable, the court noted the
company’s actions were “misleading,”167 and it “was persistent in its resistance to discovery requests.”168
159. Id. at 282.
160. 39 Wash. App. 828, 834–35, 696 P.2d 28 (1985).
161. Id. at 833, 835.
162. Id. at 836.
163. Id. at 838.
164. Wash. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 336, 858 P.2d
1054 (1993). The doctor and the plaintiff settled long before the documents were finally revealed in
the course of the case between the physician and the company. Id. at 307–08.
165. Id. at 307–08.
166. Id. at 343.
167. Id. at 352.
168. Id. at 346. See generally Brian J. Beck, Rediscovering Discovery: Washington State
Physicians Insurance Exchange and Association v. Fisons Corporation, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129
(1994); Barbara J. Gorham, Fisons: Will it Tame the Beast of Discovery Abuse?, 69 WASH. L. REV.
765 (1994); Bryan P. Harnetiaux et al., Harnessing Adversariness in Discovery Responses: A Proposal for Measuring the Duty to Disclose After Physicians Insurance Exchange and Ass’n v. Fisons
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In general, the sanction imposed for discovery abuse should be the
least severe sanction available to adequately deter, punish, compensate,
educate, and to ensure that the wrongdoer does not profit from the
wrong.169 Due process issues may arise, especially where a party is deprived of his or her day in court due to the misconduct of the party’s
counsel during discovery. The court’s decision in Smith v. Behr
Processing Corporation is instructive. In Smith, the trial court imposed
sanctions against Behr Processing for violating an order requiring witness disclosure.170 In particular, Behr failed to disclose the opinions of
certain experts and to deliver product tests revealing defects in its product.171 After an extensive evidentiary hearing on the violation, the trial
court made the requisite findings and ordered a default judgment pursuant to CR 55.172 The court of appeals affirmed, finding the sanction
did not violate Behr’s right to due process.173
A trial court must make a record of its sanctions decision, which an
appellate court will ordinarily review for an abuse of discretion.174 In
Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance,175 the Washington Supreme Court outlined several factors to be considered when determining whether a trial
court adequately considered lesser sanctions (e.g., excluding evidence or
testimony, dismissing the case, or entering an order of default) when severely sanctioning a party. Rivers v. Washington State Conference of
Mason Contractors176 synthesized these factors into a three-part test:
When a trial court imposes dismissal or default in a proceeding as a
sanction for violation of a discovery order, it must be apparent from
the record that (1) the party’s refusal to obey the discovery order
was willful or deliberate, (2) the party’s actions substantially prejudiced the opponent’s ability to prepare for trial, and (3) the trial
court explicitly considered whether a lesser sanction would probably have sufficed.177

The Burnet court reversed the trial court’s harsh sanction because it
failed to consider lesser sanctions,178 while the Rivers court remanded the
Corporation, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 499 (1994). See also In re Firestorm, 129 Wash. 2d 130, 139, 916
P.2d 411 (1996) (finding that an attorney had ex parte contact with witness, but declining to impose
disqualification of counsel as a sanction).
169. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 356.
170. Smith v. Behr Processing Corp., 113 Wash. App. 306, 315, 54 P.3d 665 (2002).
171. Id. at 315–16.
172. Id. at 316.
173. Id. at 330–31.
174. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 339, 355.
175. 131 Wash. 2d 484, 494, 933 P.2d 1036 (1997).
176. 145 Wash. 2d 674, 41 P.3d 1175 (2002).
177. Id. at 686–87.
178. 131 Wash. 2d at 499.
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case and required the trial court to make specific findings on the record
related to all three parts of the test.179
More recently, the Washington Supreme Court appeared to underscore in the strongest way the imperative of forthrightness and cooperation during discovery.180 The court upheld an $8,000,000 default judgment against a manufacturer for what it described as the manufacturer’s
“atrocious behavior in failing to respond to discovery requests throughout the lawsuit.” 181 Declaring that trial courts “need not tolerate deliberate and willful discovery abuse,” the court held the trial court had properly applied the Burnet factors in imposing one of the “harsher remedies”
under CR 37(b).182 Noting that Hyundai is a sophisticated multinational
corporation, experienced in litigation, the court held that the company
had willfully, deliberately, and continually failed to comply with Magaña’s discovery requests.183 It further held that Hyundai’s “egregious
actions” during discovery prejudiced Magaña’s ability to prepare for trial.184 The court upheld the trial court’s finding that a monetary fine
would not suffice as it was difficult to know what amount would be suitable to impose against a multi-billion dollar corporation.185 It also
upheld the trial court’s decision not to grant a continuance so as not to
reward the party who had committed the discovery violations.186 While
the court’s upholding of such an extraordinarily severe discovery sanction may raise questions about due process, it should put practitioners on
notice that the court will not take lightly its admonition in Fisons to engage forthrightly in the discovery process. It should certainly give any
attorney pause who might otherwise contemplate shielding discoverable
material from opposing counsel. The cost of doing so could prove fatal
to one’s case.
In Mayer v. Sto Industries, Inc.,187 the court of appeals held that
when a trial court imposes substantial monetary sanctions against a party
for discovery-related violations, the trial court must comply with Burnet
and Rivers.188 There, the court of appeals ordered a new trial after Sto
179. 145 Wash. 2d at 700.
180 Magaña v. Hyundai Motor America, ___ P.3d ___ 2009.
181 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 43.
182 Id. at ¶ 24.
183 The Supreme Court also held that Hyundai wrongly restricted its search for records to the
company’s legal department. Id. at ¶ 28.
184 Id. at ¶¶ 38, 46.
185 Id. at ¶ 44.
186 Id.
187. 123 Wash. App. 443, 448, 98 P.3d 116 (2004), rev’d, 156 Wash. 2d 677, 132 P.3d 115
(2006).
188. Id. at 454–55.
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failed to disclose a document in discovery but gave the plaintiffs access
to a corporate document repository.189 In the second trial, the trial court
imposed the attorney fees and expenses that the plaintiffs incurred in the
first trial as a discovery sanction without specifying the rule or other basis for the sanction.190 The court of appeals remanded, holding that the
lodestar multiplier may be applied only to fees after the contingent fee is
effective, not to the entire fee award.191 The Washington Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals, however, holding that the Burnet-Rivers
protocol was inapplicable in the context of a compensatory award under
CR 26 because those factors applied to the harsher remedies such as dismissal, default, and exclusion of testimony allowable under CR 37(b).192
The reluctance to employ the lodestar method when calculating attorney
fees as a sanction is problematic, and will be discussed in Part VI, infra.
The Washington discovery rules have their counterparts in Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 26(g) and 37. Under those rules, a court may
direct a party to pay the opposing party’s reasonable attorney fees and
costs where the opposing party is forced to expend unnecessary time and
expense due to the offending party’s failure to respond to discovery requests.193 Similarly, a court may require a party to pay reasonable expenses and fees incurred due to bad faith claims regarding discovery materials.194 An attorney must make a reasonable inquiry before certifying
discovery documents are complete or correct, or the attorney risks the
imposition of discovery sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26.195
Attorneys and clients alike may be held responsible for fees and
costs imposed as a sanction for discovery abuse.196 Furthermore, an attorney may be held personally liable for failing to comply with discovery

189. Id. at 453.
190. Id. at 455.
191. Id. at 461.
192. Mayer v. Sto Indus., Inc. (Mayer II), 156 Wash. 2d 677, 689–90, 132 P.3d 115 (2006).
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the trial court’s award of interest on costs from the first trial as part
of the sanctions awarded against the defendant. In doing so, the court appears to have given trial
courts approval to award costs beyond those typically allowed under the lodestar method. While
never discussing the lodestar method explicitly, the court cited to Roberson v. Perez, 123 Wash.
App. 320, 346-47, 96 P.3d 420 (2004), where the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s award of
travel time (which is generally not allowable when calculating a reasonable attorney fee) as compensable when attorney fees were awarded as a sanction. Mayer, 156 Wash. 2d at 692.
193. See Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 239 F.R.D. 376, 385–87 (D.N.J. 2006).
194. In re ULLICO Inc. Litig., 237 F.R.D. 314, 318–19 (D.D.C. 2006).
195. Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., 222 F.R.D. 362, 386–87 (D. Minn. 2004).
196. See Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 1994).
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orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.197 Sanctions against
counsel are a more appropriate remedy than dismissal of the client’s action where discovery violations are the result of counsel’s neglect.198
Sanctions may, however, be imposed against a client rather than the attorney where it is unclear that it was the attorney, rather than the client,
who instigated the discovery violation.199
A court must provide notice and an opportunity to be heard on the
record before imposing sanction of attorney fees for discovery violations.200
In determining the amount of attorney fees and costs to award as a
discovery sanction, the court may consider, inter alia: the skill and experience of the attorney; the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions
involved, and the skill required in addressing them; and the preclusion of
other employment.201 The court may also consider the length of time an
attorney has been in practice and the attorney’s relative experience in a
given field of practice.202
VI. THE APPROPRIATE RULE FOR CALCULATING ATTORNEY FEES AS
SANCTIONS
Because the lodestar method is the default principle for calculating
reasonable fees in Washington, a court that chooses to award attorney
fees as a sanction should calculate the fee using that method.203 Uniform
application of the lodestar method will (1) ensure an objective standard
of reasonableness; (2) discourage attorneys from abusing sanctions motions; and (3) ensure that the trial courts establish sound support for the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to the purposes underlying the rules.
The Washington Supreme Court summarized the rules relating to
the calculation of a reasonable attorney fee in Mahler v. Szucs:204
Under the lodestar methodology, a court must first determine that
counsel expended a reasonable number of hours in securing a successful recovery for the client. Necessarily, this decision requires
the court to exclude from the requested hours any wasteful or dup197. Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 323–24 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Sun v. Bd. of
Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 229 F.R.D. 584, 591–93 (C.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 473 F.3d 799 (7th Cir.
2007).
198. Butler v. Pearson, 636 F.2d 526, 531 (C.A.D.C. 1980).
199. Humphreys Exterminating Co. v. Poulter, 62 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D. Md. 1974).
200. Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 784 (9th Cir. 1983).
201. Bryant v. City of Marianna, Fla., 532 F. Supp. 133, 137–38 (N.D. Fla. 1982).
202. E.E.O.C. v. Accurate Mech. Contractors, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 828, 834 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
203. See Roberson v. Perez, 123 Wash. App. 320, 344–45, 96 P.3d 420 (2004) (explaining that
the lodestar calculation was not required where a fee award was reasonable).
204. 135 Wash. 2d 398, 957 P.2d 632 (1998).
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licative hours and any hours pertaining to unsuccessful theories or
claims. Counsel must provide contemporaneous records of documenting the hours worked . . . . [S]uch documentation need not be
exhaustive or in minute detail, but must inform the court, in addition
to the number of hours worked, of the type of work performed, and
the category of attorney who performed the work (i.e., senior partner, associate, etc.).
The court must also determine the reasonableness of the hourly rate
of counsel at the time the lawyer actually billed the client for services.
Finally, the lodestar fee, calculated by multiplying the reasonable
hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours incurred in obtaining
the successful result, may, in rare instances, be adjusted upward or
downward in the trial court’s discretion.205

Although Washington courts generally recognize the lodestar method as
the default principle for calculating a reasonable attorney fee, Washington courts have on occasion determined the lodestar method does not or
may not apply.206
Until the Washington Supreme Court’s Mahler decision, most observers assumed that the lodestar methodology applied to calculate the
fee imposed as a sanction for discovery misconduct, particularly because
federal courts employed the same method.207 Presumptively, that same
method would govern the calculation of a reasonable fee under CR 11 or
RCW 4.84.185.208 However, in Highland School District No. 203 v.
Racy,209 the court of appeals declined to apply the lodestar method to
calculate a sanction under the statute; although it analyzed the trial
court’s fee award under that methodology, the court concluded that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its fee award.210 The
Racy court, however, was affected by the fact that counsel for the party
seeking fees agreed to charge the client a low hourly rate, and the trial
court adopted the rate as the basis for its fee award.211 Under the proper
lodestar calculation, the actual, not the theoretical, hourly rate should be
205. Id. at 434 (internal citations omitted).
206. See Roberson v. Perez, 123 Wash. App. 320, 344–45, 96 P.3d 420 (2004). See also Brand
v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. 2d 659, 666, 989 P.2d 1111 (1999) (noting that awarding full
attorney fees under the Industrial Insurance Act to workers will ensure adequate representation for
injured workers).
207. Roberson, 123 Wash. App. at 344.
208. See, e.g., Zink v. City of Mesa, 137 Wash. App. 271, 277, 152 P.3d 1044 (2007), review
denied, 162 Wash. 2d 1014 (2008).
209. 149 Wash. App. 307, 202 P.3d 1024 (2009).
210. Id. at 314–16.
211. Id. at 315.
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applied in any event and adjusted upward or downward after the lodestar
is calculated.212
The lodestar methodology is a well-developed means of requiring a
court to “show its work.”213 It must identify which hours, for example,
were spent by the attorneys to achieve a favorable result. This prevents
counsel from claiming excessive or unnecessary time as part of a discovery sanction.214 For Washington courts to simply impose whatever fee
award they choose without a methodology to establish that the fee is reasonable departs from the wise mandate that sanctions should not be confused with fee-shifting statutes; rather, sanctions should represent the
amounts reasonably expended to respond to the improper conduct.
The appropriate rule for calculating a reasonable attorney fee in a
CR 11, RCW 4.84.185, frivolous appeal, or discovery sanction case
should be the lodestar method.

212. Id. at 316.
213. Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wash. 2d 581, 205–06, 675 P.2d 193 (1983)
(finding nothing in trial court record to suggest an upward adjustment of rate due to attorneys’ performance); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 114 Wash. 2d 109, 123, 786 P.2d 265 (1990) (determining
that the trial court did not limit award to extra litigation efforts); Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash. 2d 398,
435, 957 P.2d 632 (1998) (holding that findings of fact and conclusions of law are required to establish such a record).
214. Pham v. City of Seattle, 159 Wash. 2d 527, 538–39, 151 P.3d 976 (2007) (affirming the
trial court’s decision to exclude time spent on unsuccessful activities associated with an otherwise
successful claim).

